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Background on the National Intelligence Council Project 
  
In the summer of 1999, the National Intelligence Council tasked the University of Maryland to 
serve as a portal for identifying and presenting leading academic research on topics of particular 
interest to the US intelligence community, based on the Strategic Themes laid down by the 
Director of Central Intelligence.  The project’s investigation into forces shaping the evolution of 
the nation-state will contribute to Global Trends 2015, a NIC publication due to be issued in the 
fall of 2000.  Global Trends 2015 will describe significant international characteristics and trends 
likely to affect the future security of the United States. 
  
The Conference on the Evolution of the Nation-State Through 2015 was the culmination of an 
intensive inquiry into the factors that influence state performance and their likely effect upon 
state capacity, cohesion, and legitimacy in the year 2015.  Several conceptual planning sessions, 
three one-day workshops and a number of expert consultations were conducted prior to the 
conference.  Leading scholars in each research field applicable to the project’s central topic 






The participants identified many circumstances that might substantially affect the evolution of 
the nation-state between now and 2015, but they did not anticipate its demise or even its radical 
transformation.  Generally they emphasized the adaptability of the state as a form of political 
organization. Given the diversity of influences at work, they did not envision any single 
predominant outcome.  They did explore some of the consequential changes that might result 
from four basic sources:  
 
• the process of globalization,  
• the evolution of political attitudes,  
• the activities of non-state actors, and  
• emerging standards of governmental performance. 
  
Among the project participants, a consensus emerged that states will remain the principal actors 
in international affairs in the world of 2015, although individuals differed considerably regarding 
the degree of predominance states would retain.  This range of views primarily stemmed from 
differing beliefs regarding the impact of globalization and the changing role of non-state actors.  
Some contended that the development of a more interdependent world would create more and 
more transsovereign problems that are not responsive to unilateral state action.  But this does not 
imply that multilateral state action would be ineffective.  Similarly, it was argued that the 
continuing rise of newly influential non-state actors and their networks would compete with the 
state for people’s allegiance in certain issue areas.  At the other end of this debate, project 
participants argued that states possessed the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances rather 
than be overcome by them.  Others asserted that states governed in accordance with increasingly 
standardized performance criteria could preserve legitimacy even while delegating to non-state 
actors the responsibility for providing various services within the state’s territory. 
  
Participants concluded that all of these arguments had merit.  Given the widely disparate 
capacities of states and varying popular standards of expected state performance, individual 
states will respond to globalization and the rise of non-state actors differently.  Some states – 
developed states appear to have an advantage in this regard –are likely to use globalization-
related developments and non-state actors as tools to improve their legitimacy and cohesion.  
Other states will not be able to handle the evolving international environment, and some of these 
will fail or collapse. A number of states will merely cope: their governments will remain in 
power, but these states will not contribute meaningfully to solving pressing transsovereign 
problems, and their citizens’ quality of life will lag behind.  
  
The range of possible state responses notwithstanding, conference participants reached 
agreement on three additional points.  First, unilateral state action will become less effective as 
transsovereign problems become more prevalent.  Second, ongoing globalization and the 
increasing influence of non-state actors will pressure states to change the manner in which they 
exercise authority over affairs in their territories.  Governments will change from monopoly 
providers of services to managers of services that are provided both by the state and by a variety 
of non-state actors.  Third, the increased numbers and influence of non-state actors that operate 
across state boundaries and the need to grapple with transsovereign problems will tend to create 




Summary of Proceedings 
  
John Steinbruner opened the conference by noting that states will live in a world increasingly 
characterized by five influences.  First, the world will experience prodigious efficiency gains in 
the handling of information.  Second, population dynamics will be characterized by rapid growth 
at least through 2025, with virtually all of the projected increase expected to occur in the poorest 
quintile of the world’s population.  Third, based on current trends, it appears that, as the process 
of adjustment to technological change proceeds, the benefits of economic growth will be 
concentrated at the top of the economic spectrum, causing the gulf between richest and poorest to 
grow.  Fourth, skewed population and economic development will lead to increased pressure for 
more equitable social development.  If too many societies fail to provide a more equitable pattern 
of development, the world as a whole may experience massive political instability.  Fifth, 
economic growth must be accomplished in an environmentally tractable manner to ensure its 
sustainability, a monumentally difficult task since improving standards of living mandate a 
doubling of food production and a tripling of energy production by 2050. 1 
  
  
The Effects of Globalization 
  
Against this backdrop, the participants discussed the impact of globalization on state behavior.  
Particular attention was paid to the dramatically increased efficiency of handling information, the 
integration of national economies into global financial markets, the increasing porosity of 
borders, and the continuing expansion in the volume of international trade – all factors that make 
states progressively more interdependent (or dependent in some cases) upon forces and 
institutions outside their borders.  Although there was no consensus about the cumulative effects 
of globalization on the state except that they appear to be very wide-ranging, the group noted that 
the ability of states to cope with globalization varied considerably.   
  
                                                 
1 See John D. Steinbruner, Principles of Global Security (Washington, DC: the Brookings Institution Press, 2000). 
Richard Rosecrance presented one view of how a state can respond to globalization in a way 
that successfully preserves its capacity, legitimacy, and cohesion.  He argued that a state must 
increasingly concentrate on managing flows to achieve a greater share of world output rather 
than, as in the past, focusing on amassing amounts of territory, natural resources, population, and 
production within its borders.2  Historically, state capacity had been viewed in military terms, 
always concerned with the ability to control and mobilize manpower and other resources.  Now, 
states are moving toward a model more like that of a modern multinational corporation, 
employing decentralized production and outsourcing for raw materials and intermediate 
products.  If these trends continue, states must be in a position to control flows across and within 
their borders.  In addition to directing flows of capital, technology, and labor, the state must also 
attract the right factors to enter its own territory.  Rosecrance stressed that this phenomenon does 
not necessarily mean that the state is weaker, but rather that the source of its power and capacity 
has changed. 
  
Rosecrance has coined the term “virtual state” to describe a state whose government makes this 
adjustment and continues to thrive as globalization intensifies.  Because the virtual state is 
primarily concerned with managing flows of capital, technology, human resources, and 
information, the quality of its educational system and the refinement of the infrastructure 
supporting its service-based economy clearly become predominant elements of state capacity.  
  
In one of the more provocative images of the conference, Rosecrance asserted that these trends 
would lead states to become divided into “head” and “body” states.  Head states, with their 
mature financial systems, high educational levels, and advanced technological capability, will 
optimize their work forces to provide services, including the design and financing of production 
facilities in the body states, where large pools of relatively inexpensive labor can produce goods 
at lower cost than in the head countries.  Body states can develop into head states, and until then, 
can leverage their comparative advantage in production to pit head state against head state in 
competition for the body state’s production capability.3 
  
But other conference participants challenged this optimistic scenario.  First, Ann Florini was 
skeptical that body states could routinely evolve into head states, observing that a system 
characterized by a head/body state division could intensify inequality and be inherently unstable.  
Second, Carmen Reinhart noted that banking sectors are often improperly monitored, fiscal and 
monetary policies may not be sufficiently responsible, and even well regulated economies face 
recession when foreign investment booms inevitably die out and inflows of capital diminish.  
Third, some noted that many developing states find themselves confronted with a dilemma when 
dealing with globalization.  State governments must open their economies to global competition 
in order to attract development capital, but this leaves them dangerously susceptible to financial 
crises.  An open economy in an interdependent world can be a risky venture for a developing 
state. 
  
Transnational criminal organizations and their networks pose a serious challenge to even the 
most technologically developed states, as Phil Williams observed.  Well-financed and 
                                                 
2 See Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century  (New York: 
Basic Books, 1999). 
3 Ibid, xi-xii. 
technologically-refined transnational criminal organizations and networks, unencumbered by the 
need to remain within the law and capable of shifting their base of operations to the most 
accommodating country, actively seek to exploit the weak points, or “capacity gaps,” in a state’s 
enforcement mechanisms.  While developed states may use advanced technology against 
criminal elements, this technique entails a danger of imposing such harsh restraints upon its 
citizens’ civil liberties that state legitimacy suffers and the quality of civil society decreases.  
This is a particularly sensitive limitation where democratic forms of government are concerned. 
  
Williams suggested that the severity of the threat of organized crime has become so pronounced 
that it would begin to redefine the idea of a state.  He introduced the term “captured state” to 
describe situations in which criminal influence has become so pervasive that the state effectively 
becomes a partner with organized crime. Some states have essentially been taken over by 
organized crime and are termed “criminal states.”  The implication of this trend is the creation of 
a bifurcated world, with captured and criminal states set against lawful states. 
  
Others suggested that the challenge posed by globalization might be even more fundamental, 
leading to a qualitatively different type of international structure in which states no longer serve 
as the principal actors.  Maryann Cusimano contended that globalization is causing the 
development of more and more problems that are transsovereign in nature.4  Solving 
transsovereign problems requires capacity, authority, and legitimacy, yet no one actor (including 
states) has the requisite strengths in all three areas.  Accordingly, state governments must 
increasingly rely upon networks of actors to combat these problems.  Networks can include 
states, intergovernmental organizations, transnational corporations, and organizations in the 
nonprofit sector, each network member being selected for its particular capabilities.  Cusimano 
asserts that this shift is significant because states, which once exercised extensive control over 
affairs that affected their territory and population, must now surrender some control to its 
network partners if transsovereign problems are to be successfully combated.  Even strong states 
are increasingly “contracting out” to licit non-state actors in an attempt to align capacity to 
authority and legitimacy.  Licit and illicit non-state actors perform functions which states are 
either unable or unwilling to perform.   
  
Cusimano did not argue that the state will disappear, but that sovereignty is changing.  In 
democratizing states, and states undergoing transitions after empire, state capacity has declined 
(e.g. Russia, South Africa).  Regime effectiveness suffers as new political and economic 
institutions are constructed while day-to-day governance must continue.  However, legitimacy 
may be increasing in these states even though state capacity is decreasing.  In developed states, 
one might argue that globalization’s open markets, societies, and technologies are increasing 
state capacity.  However, even in the most powerful states, such as the United States, the public 
sector is either shrinking or not growing as fast as the private sector.  Relative to the private 
sector, state capacity has decreased, leading even the strongest states to enter into partnerships 
with non-state actors to try to manage transsovereign problems, from money laundering to 
cybercrime.  In places like Colombia, disproportionate growth in the private sector vs. the public 
sector allowed criminal and terrorist networks to grow faster than the state’s ability to respond.  
Democratic, capitalist states are not able to increase state capacity radically without 
compromising ideological principles that underlie the legitimacy of the state.  Non-state actors 
                                                 
4 See Maryann Cusimano, Beyond Sovereignty:  Issues for a Global Agenda (Boston:  St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 
are able to make relatively free use of significant prior investments in global infrastructure.  
States will not wither away; citizens still expect states to provide justice, peace, and collective 
representation.  However, the private sector is investing in information technology faster and 
more extensively than the public sector.  The private sector also uses more adaptive, network 
organizational structures, which are faster and more fluid than the public sector’s preferred 
organizational form, the hierarchical bureaucracy.  This means that the private sector’s capacity 
is increasing in technology, information, speed of response, adaptive organizational structures, 
resources, personnel, and competency relative to state capacity.  States’ attempts to work with 
the private sector to manage transsovereign problems (by borrowing, buying, or deferring to 
private sector capacity) may have the unintended effect of further undermining and changing 
sovereignty. 
  
Lester Salamon pointed out that the explosive growth of influential non-state actors is affecting 
not only the range of governmental functions, but how states govern.  The “new governance” 
entails a shift away from “programs and policies” thinking towards a “tools and instruments of 
action” approach.  An associated shift, in which the nonprofit sector is very significant, is in a 
change from “public sector versus private sector” thinking towards “public sector plus private 
sector” thinking.  This alters the role of the nation-state away from command and control 
towards negotiation and persuasion.  Where governments have traditionally viewed themselves 
as the exclusive provider of services, they will evolve into managers of services, turning over the 
provision of certain services to non-state actors that are better qualified to provide them.5  
  
As the influence of non-state actors grows, and the interaction between states and non-state 
actors expands, transparency may become a major tool in facilitating the adaptation to some of 
globalization’s effects, says Ann Florini.  An organization is transparent when information 
concerning its financial, administrative, and operational practices is available to the public.  
Observing that the vast majority of non-state actors do not practice transparency, Florini stressed 
the need for greater transparency as the influence of these actors grows.  She noted that 
globalization is already nurturing the creation of a global civil society, whose nascent strength 
was demonstrated at the WTO meeting in Seattle.  Many civil society actors are networked very 
effectively, and are able to exert considerable influence on policy.  For state governments to be 
effective as the number of influential non-state actors grows, they must be able to obtain a large 
amount of reliable information about the operations of individual actors and their networks.  
Similarly, the public must have access to reliable information, both to facilitate the grassroots 
assessment of government performance and to foster the development of healthy civil societies, 
both domestically and internationally. 
  
Florini observed that, even where transparency exists, the state finds it very difficult to obtain 
and manage such large amounts of data.  Fortunately, transparency often makes large-scale data 
management by the state unnecessary.  Some regulatory actions by the state have fostered 
transparency and consequently have led to changes in behavior through grassroots action rather 
than government enforcement.  For example, the lowering of toxic waste levels by US industry 
following the passage of the Community Right to Know Act resulted from public mobilization 
                                                 
5 See Lester Salamon, “Nonstate Actors on the Global Scene:  The Case of Civil Society Organizations,” paper 
prepared for the National Intelligence Council Project, April 18, 2000. 
after the government required firms to make information about pollution levels from individual 
sites available to the public, not from enhanced government oversight. 
  
Regardless of whether a fundamental change in the international system is underway, everyone 
expected states to remain predominant at least through 2015, and probably for considerably 
longer.  But this consensus also incorporated the view that, in general, state capacity would 
decrease over the next fifteen years as a result of globalization and the increasing influence of 
non-state actors and their networks.  This consensus was based on three principal reasons.  First, 
John Steinbruner noted that states seem naturally suited to provide certain essential or core 
services that will continue to legitimize them unless individual regimes practice such poor 
governance that they drive their citizens to look for alternatives.  These services include the 
maintenance of law and order and the provision of justice.  Second, Stephen Krasner contended 
that states are a very flexible form of political order with many tools at their disposal – including 
a bendable definition of sovereignty – for co-opting and otherwise accommodating increasing 
interdependencies and the emergence of newly-empowered non-state actors.6  Third, both 
Krasner, in the distinction he draws between the concepts of state control and state authority,   
and Stephen Flynn, who best illustrated this distinction through his discussion of the problems 
resulting from the increasing porosity of borders, called attention to the fact that the legitimacy 
that citizens ascribe to their state’s government is not directly proportional to the government’s 
ability to control directly events within its territory.  
  
While these three factors provide states with the means to respond to globalization’s many 
challenges to state authority, actual responses will depend on each state’s particular endowment 
of internal resources and practices, as well as on the specific external pressures involved.  Even 
“successful” responses -- those that preserve the state’s authority, legitimacy, and cohesion -- are 
likely to be accompanied by changes in state structure and governance.  
  
  
The Evolution of Political Attitudes 
  
Any assessment of state capacity, legitimacy and cohesion requires the application of some set of 
standards defining what constitutes sufficient state performance in these areas.  This is true even 
if one is only concerned with a “pass/fail” criterion, where failure means that the state has 
succumbed to violence or financial crisis.  However, if a more precise standard for measuring 
state performance is desired, it becomes apparent that the criteria for what constitutes acceptable 
capacity, legitimacy, and cohesion can and does vary from state to state and across time.  
  
Stability within the state, according to I. William Zartman, is tied to an appropriate balance in 
the types and amounts of functions a state performs.  Basically, citizens surrender some of their 
wealth and forgo certain liberties to live in a given state, and the ruling regime provides services, 
including some commitment to improving quality of life and the enforcement of law and order. 
State collapse is predicated upon the failure of the regime to provide expected services.  The 
expectations of the citizenry are predicated upon the amount of taxes they pay and the liberties 
they forgo.  
  
                                                 
6 See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty:  Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
Zartman contended that an enormous increase in expectations has occurred since World War II.  
The state is not being replaced, but the number of functions that society expects it to perform has 
increased dramatically.  Since states vary considerably in their ability to provide all of these 
additional functions, non-state actors have taken on many of them.  In addition to taking over 
state functions, Zartman noted that non-state actors could raise or lower public expectations 
regarding certain state functions. 
  
Zartman believes that popular expectations of state capacity peaked during the heyday of 
communist regimes (whose expectations were successfully exported to many post-colonial 
states) and may now be declining.  But conference participants were divided regarding whether 
the size of the “pie” of functions will continue to grow. 
  
Assessing shifting public attitudes towards state performance requires identifying an appropriate 
baseline from which to judge the effects of current trends.  Stephen Krasner focused on the 
concept of sovereignty, which he argued has always been violated to some degree.  Moreover, 
sovereignty is much more complex than the traditional view of a clearly packaged bundle of 
rules. Sovereignty has four dimensions, which do not always work together, either logically or 
empirically.  These dimensions are: 
• domestic sovereignty, or the authority structure within states and the degree to which that 
structure exercises internal control; 
• interdependence sovereignty, or the control over cross-border flows; 
• international legal sovereignty, a set of rules by which territorially bounded political entities 
with juridical independence are recognized; and 
• Westphalian sovereignty, or the exclusion of external authority over domestic issues. 
  
Krasner pointed to an “organized hypocrisy” in which most states generally invoked the rules of 
sovereignty, but frequently violated them. Violations of Westphalian sovereignty were 
particularly numerous. 
  
Krasner’s observations focused the group on the fact that states do not have to be mere 
bystanders where standards and expectations are concerned.  First, governments can and do 
actively participate in setting expectations.  For example, Zartman observed that, by promising 
their people extensive social services, communist and socialist regimes have had the effect of 
raising popular expectations concerning what constitutes adequate state capacity.  At the other 
end of the spectrum, he noted that the people of disappearing and collapsed states7 will slowly 
reduce their expectations concerning the services the state should provide, often coming to 
expect non-state actors to fill gaps in the provision of services.  This process can work both 
ways, however: revolutionary movements and other non-state actors can preemptively seek to 
change popular expectations in ways that make state capacity appear inadequate. 
  
Second, state governments may recognize that non-state actors might be the best agents to 
provide certain services that citizens reasonably expect.  In many cases, a government can 
delegate control to these actors, meet the expectations of their citizens, and, if handled properly, 
actually gain legitimacy in the process.  For example, Stephen Flynn argued that, given the 
                                                 
7 These kinds of states are discussed on page 24. 
techniques for controlling the movement of vast amounts of goods that business firms have 
developed, the U.S. government should delegate to certain offshore production companies the 
authority to prescreen certain types of intermediate manufactured goods that are subsequently 
shipped to the United States for final assembly.  This policy would alleviate the demands on 
already overworked U.S. Customs inspectors at major border crossing points where the sheer 
volume of goods and transactions that must be inspected under demanding time constraints 
seriously degrades the ability of current techniques to intercept contraband.  Flynn asserted that, 
given the need for large manufacturing firms to outsource and to practice “just in time” inventory 
control to remain competitive, companies should welcome this kind of government-business 
partnership because it improves transaction predictability and minimizes the time that goods are 
in transit. 
  
Third, states can abdicate control over functions that have become too fractious or otherwise too 
hard to handle without loss of legitimacy.  Krasner contends that the Peace of Westphalia 
incorporated just such an event: despite rhetorically endorsing the slogan cuius regio eius religio 
(the principle that the ruler could set the religion of his territory), at least within the Holy Roman 
Empire there was a commitment to religious toleration.  The principalities of the Empire agreed 
to a consociational form of decision making that effectively denied rulers the right to act 
unilaterally on religious issues.  Although this decision constituted a severe decrease in state 
capacity, states emerged as more unified political structures because they had shed responsibility 
for controlling an extremely contentious issue.  
  
Fourth, Krasner’s four-dimensional definition of sovereignty implies that a state can offset 
decreases in one dimension of sovereignty by increasing its reliance on another dimension over 
which it has greater control.  For example, many of the factors eroding domestic sovereignty (the 
ability of government to exercise control within its territory) are based on flows.  The state 
possessing the appropriate endowments may be able to partially offset the erosion of domestic 
sovereignty by subscribing to international agreements that strengthen its interdependence 
sovereignty (the ability of state government to regulate flows across its borders). 
  
  
The Increasing Influence of Non-State Actors 
 
Non-state actors are not new to the international (or domestic) arena, but their numbers and 
influence have increased dramatically in recent years and continue to expand, fanned by the 
spread of information technology, the increasing importance of transsovereign issues, and 
changes in popular expectations.   
  
Power relationships between non-state actors and the state defy simple categorization.  Some 
non-state actors and networks of non-state actors have been able to exert their collective will and 
bring about desired outcomes at the expense of the state’s capacity and legitimacy (e.g., 
transnational criminal networks).  In other cases, non-state actors help to harmonize state effort 
with that of other organizations, thus increasing the overall efficiency with which important 
issues are tackled (e.g., the Rollback Malaria Initiative).  Still other non-state actors serve as 
extensions of the state, receiving a majority of their funding from state governments.  This 
arrangement helps state governments distance themselves from projects that they either are ill-
equipped to support directly or prefer to keep at arms length (e.g., many states provide funding to 
humanitarian nonprofit organizations that distribute food and medical aid).  In these cases, state 
legitimacy may be preserved, or even enhanced, despite the fact that the state has reduced its 
capacity.  Other non-state actors fill “capacity gaps,” i.e., perform functions that help people at 
the grassroots level when the state is unable to do so or is skeptical that some new innovation 
will work (e.g., microlending enterprises).  In these cases, state legitimacy may suffer.  Still other 
non-state actors remain marginalized, but the increasing spread of Internet access allows these 
groups to organize larger and larger constituencies and speak with ever-louder voices. 
  
The organizational forms of non-state actors vary widely.  While some organizations rely on 
traditional hierarchical organizational structures, many increasingly rely upon a structure in 
which authority is widely distributed.  Anthony Judge contends that non-state actor networks 
are beginning to eclipse individual member organizations in importance.  Network membership 
often crosses traditional boundaries to include state governments, transnational corporations, and 
nonprofit organizations in various combinations.  Systematic analyses of networks is just 
beginning, making this an important area for additional research.8  Authority structures within 
many organizations and networks are not democratically based.  As noted by Ann Florini, non-
state actors differ considerably in terms of their transparency, i.e., the degree to which their 
operations, decision-making processes, and sources of funding are open to public scrutiny. 
  
Despite their diversity, non-state actors can be broadly grouped into four categories: 
• for-profit organizations,  
• intergovernmental organizations, 
• nonprofit organizations, and 
• criminal organizations. 
  
  
The For-Profit Sector 
Virginia Haufler’s paper9 contended that the growth in transnational corporations is one of the 
major challenges to states today.  Transnational corporations (TNCs) operate on a global basis, 
and their manufacturing facilities are integrated into a global production strategy.  Multinational 
corporations (MNCs), in contrast, are multidivisional business organizations in which separate 
production facilities are established in different countries.  More MNCs are becoming TNCs, and 
the top 100 TNCs are becoming increasingly transnationalized.  The largest possess assets 
greater than all but a handful of states. One effect of transnationalization is the fact that a 
growing share of world exports and imports is now accounted for by trade within corporations 
instead of between them. The most transnational sectors among the top 100 TNCs overall are 
food and beverages, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and electronics and electrical equipment.  
  
Haufler asserted that the organization of production has changed dramatically over the past two 
decades. Major corporations have centralized decision-making within the firm and some 
                                                 
8 See Anthony Judge, “Identifying, Counting, and Categorizing Intergovernmental Organizations,” paper prepared 
for the National Intelligence Council Project, 13 April 2000,  
9 For additional information, see Virginia Haufler, “Identifying, Counting, and categorizing actors in the For-Profit 
Sector and Their Effects on State Capacity,” paper prepared for the National Intelligence Council Project, April 18, 
2000. 
international markets are now dominated by only a few firms. At the same time, many firms are 
decentralizing operations into transnational networks of partners and suppliers. Large and small 
corporations participate in various types of relationships including joint ventures, strategic 
alliances, and technology partnerships. Networks of contractual relationships blur the boundaries 
of the firm and redefine the nature of international economic competition, as competitors 
cooperate on specific ventures. With the advent of e-commerce, corporate organization will 
change further, facilitating global, decentralized commercial relationships. All of this represents 
a transformation of the business world from the traditional hierarchical, arm's-length model of 
organization and competition to something that is more complex and difficult to characterize.   
  
Citing the 1998 UNCTAD World Investment Report, Haufler reported that there are at least 
53,000 transnational corporations with more than 450,000 affiliates. Worldwide, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has increased steadily. FDI combines long-term investment capital, managerial 
expertise, and technology into an integrated package in which the parent corporation has an 
ownership stake and is directly involved in the management of its foreign holdings. The majority 
of foreign direct investment is concentrated in the developed countries, with more than 2/3 of 
inward FDI and 90% of outward FDI stocks located there. The developing countries, however, 
have increased their share of foreign investment significantly in the 1990s. Most foreign direct 
investment in the past few years has flowed to newly emerging East Asian markets, especially 
China. While the financial crisis of 1998 slowed down investment and completely reversed 
short-term capital flows at least temporarily, long-term investors expanded their stakes in South 
Korea and China. Most corporations invest in foreign countries in order to gain the advantages of 
a particular location (in terms of resources and markets) and to gain efficiencies from 
internationalizing the costs of production.  
  
Haufler pointed out three of the most significant trends in the past decade have been: the wave of 
mergers and acquisitions across national boundaries; the large privatizations of government-
owned assets in many countries around the world; and the more welcoming attitude by almost all 
developing countries towards foreign investment. Transnational mergers and acquisitions each 
year attain a new record in terms of the size of the deal involved. Privatizations in the big 
emerging markets alone (BEM) have been steady and massive, attracting foreign investment in 
the newly privatized assets. Almost every country has revised its laws to be more investment-
friendly. Despite this trend, there still remain some sectors that individual governments declare 
off-limits to foreign investors, such as certain real estate, print and electronic media, and 
transportation.   
  
Haufler asserted that transnational corporations affect state capacity in a number of ways, both 
positively and negatively. How vulnerable a country is to challenges from transnational 
corporate activity depends on the size and attractiveness of its market. TNCs decide where to 
invest their capital and technology, and thus determine to a large extent where economic activity 
and innovation will occur. Transnational corporations do not just determine the location of 
investment, but also the organization of production and the degree of technological transfer. The 
networks of partners and suppliers a TNC constructs provides it with more flexibility to cut 
contractual relationships quickly. This means local companies have a much more tenuous link to 
the global economy than if they were integrated more directly within a corporate organization.   
  
Many government policy makers fear that transnational corporations are too transnational, with 
little commitment to any one national economy. The industrialized countries in particular express 
concern that even long-standing investors in a country may pull up roots and move offshore if a 
better opportunity presents itself. This action could undermine industrial and employment 
policies and create economic havoc in local communities. Typically, transnational corporations 
prefer not to be associated with any one country, although the way they organize and conduct 
business clearly reflects significant characteristics of their country of origin. In conflicts between 
home and host countries, many foreign investors try to remain neutral, although this can be 
extremely difficult.   
  
Industry standard-setting and corporate diplomacy are two areas of activity that have received 
much less attention than they deserve in discussions of state capacity. Both may affect state 
capacity by changing the relationships between the public and private sectors. Standard-setting 
typically is viewed as a public good that is a basic function of government. Private efforts to set 
industry standards may supply all the benefits of standardization without the need for 
government intervention, but it may also lead to the adoption of standards with pro-business 
biases that pose high barriers to entry to particular firms and countries attempting to participate 
in international markets. International corporate diplomacy is part of a larger trend in which non-
state actors are almost equal participants in world affairs. The shape of world politics in the 
coming years will be determined significantly by negotiations among all actors that use 
transnational networks to coordinate their operations: non-governmental nonprofit groups; 
intergovernmental organizations; transnational corporations; and sovereign governments.  
  
With regard to the future, Haufler concluded by observing that the vast majority of economic 
transactions are still within local markets, particularly in the service sector. Europe and the 
United States probably will continue to be the major exporters and importers of capital well into 
the new century.  Foreign markets will become temporarily more attractive for equity 
investment, but the advanced industrialized markets will remain attractive due to their size and 
openness. These countries will be the site for much of the consolidation within industry sectors, 
such as automobiles and telecommunications. The more centralized, high value added activities 
of TNCs will be located in these nations. Among the main OECD countries, the capacity and 
legitimacy of the state may be challenged by transnational corporations in a number of 
significant areas, but primarily in the areas of taxation and regulation of the private sector. Firms 
will increase their engagement with nongovernmental and intergovernmental actors in response 
to increased consumer and shareholder activism, as well as to counter the increased threat of 
government regulation. Haufler concluded by noting that a strong backlash against globalization 
and against corporate activity may be possible, which could turn back some of the economic 
openness of the last several years. 
  
Intergovernmental Organizations 
Anthony Judge began his remarks by noting that there have been numerous initiatives to 
identify, count and categorize intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).  However, as society 
becomes more complex, fluid, and dynamic, international organizations change along with it, 
and it becomes necessary to examine more comprehensive ways of categorizing their features.  It 
is particularly useful to explore the nature of IGO interlinkages with other transnational bodies 
and networks, especially when this contributes to hybridization of form and function across 
classical categories. 
  
Judge described how the subject classification scheme of the Union of International Association 
(UIA) shifts the paradigm from the conventional laundry list of topics to an integrative structure 
more consistent with the pattern of functional interaction between subjects.  A rich scheme of 
categories can predict the possible existence of unidentified forms of intergovernmental 
organization, and can also encourage the design and use of unforeseen types of organization.  
The intention is to proceed progressively from the relatively unmistakable to the more 
ambiguous and challenging cases. 
  
Judge categorized IGOs by clustering them into three groups.  Group 1 clusters dimensions that 
tend to be prime determinants of whether a “body” can be recognized as “existing” because it has 
some tangible form (physical offices), a legal form, and whether these exhibit some pattern over 
time.  The most conventional and narrow view of intergovernmental organization would focus on 
bodies that were permanent and treaty-based with secretariats.  Bodies of this type are the easiest 
about which to obtain data.  Group 2 clusters dimensions that determine whether a body has 
come into existence as the result of an intergovernmental initiative, regardless of whether it 
exists according to Group 1 guidelines.  The most conventional and narrow view of this category 
of intergovernmental organization would focus on bodies that were public, unmediated and 
autonomous, i.e., non-hybrid forms.  But organizations in this category can still become very 
complex.  For example, intergovernmental organizations may form collaborative arrangements, 
typically task forces for purposes of coordination on issues of common interest.  Group 3 
categorizes according to the nature of the IGO’s membership.  Membership can be categorized 
according to the geographic area from which an IGO draws its membership or by the area in 
which it operates (e.g., universal, regional, bi-lateral).  IGOs can also be categorized according to 
the mix of governmental and nongovernmental organizations in their membership, by the degree 
with which they interact with other state and non-state actors, by their mode of operations (e.g., 
information exchange, consultative, technical), and by the degree to which they operate in a 
given sector of activity (e.g., banking, economic development, climate change, human rights).  
The most conventional and narrow view of intergovernmental organization would tend to avoid 
the variants on each dimension, which apparently detract from the “intergovernmental” quality 
because of their specificity. 
  
Judge contended that attempts at categorization fail to capture the major shifts in international 
organization that have occurred over recent decades.  The functional boundaries of IGOs 
(through strategic alliances, partnerships, coalitions, multi-group initiatives and campaigns) have 
been effectively redefined.  Most importantly, the meaningful unit of analysis is shifting 
increasingly from isolated entities to networks or configurations of entities.  There have also 
been shifts:  
• from “proper hierarchical channels” to unforeseen links between unrepresentative bodies 
acting at every level, often in an ill-defined semi-official capacity;  
• from an emphasis on “representativity” to emphasis on capacity, initiative and “creativity”; 
• from IGOs defining issues and initiating programs to external issues and initiatives 
redefining IGOs; 
• from reliance on a single strategic plan to dependence on an “ecology” of strategic initiatives; 
and 
• from real, objective, stable substantive issues to dynamic media-spun issues of perception. 
  
According to Judge, these developments have generated a need to move beyond the practice of 
simply counting the number and types of organizations to assess IGO operations for the 21st 
century.  Rather, emphasis should be placed on answering the following questions: 
 
• At what stage does the network of linkages in which an IGO is embedded become of equal or 
greater significance than the actor treated in isolation?  
• In shifting the unit of institutional analysis to networks of entities, how should such an 
analysis integrate corresponding information on networks of issues with which people 
identify, and with the networks of strategies used to manage these issues?   
  
These questions are especially important because evolving issues and strategy networks might 
anticipate intergovernmental institutional development rather than follow it, making such 
analyses vital for effective policy integration. 
  
Judge asserted that the importance of innovation in the structure and use of intergovernmental 
organizations in the 21st century would center around: 
 
• emergent forms of configuration:  significance may lie in the configuration or networks of 
organizations rather than in individual organizations considered in isolation;  
• the dynamics of the configuration rather than in the static structure; 
• the evolution of the network configuration, rather than its current form; 
• the development of alternatives to the emergent networking pattern; and 
• the ability to match network structure to the specific issue it is meant to address. 
  
Judge stated that the global challenge is to explore and develop “organizational ecosystems,” 
operate “ecosystems of strategies,” and deal with “ecosystems of problems,” in the light of 
“ecosystems of values.”  Equivalent challenges exist at the national level.  It is unfortunate that 
these challenges are addressed by nation-states in a strategic environment that has largely shifted 
its center of gravity from “statics” to “dynamics.”  Judge asserted that the dynamism of 
problems, and the creativity of transnational criminal networks, will drag the nation-state into a 
new mode during the years to 2015 -- catalyzed by the potentials of the Internet with which the 
politically apathetic younger generations will identify.   
  
Judge asserted that the many territorial disputes that currently destabilize global society point to 
the failure of intergovernmental organization to shift to a more complex level of analysis of 
boundaries.  Within this emerging environment, much depends on a shift in perspective.  In a 
world of gaps (north-south, male-female, young-old), the most fundamental gap is liable to be 
between commitment to the static attribute of states and an ability to function in terms of global 
dynamics.  Many bodies and institutions will learn to function on either side of the gap and will 
be able to transmit between them.  The core challenge to the nation-state is liable to be its over-
identification with static boundaries and structures in a world that is liable to be defined above all 
by shifting boundaries and structures in transformation.  The nation-states that will thrive in this 
new environment will be those that discover ways of getting “into the flow,” so that they can 
play a role in motivating constituencies and reframing concepts. 
  
Judge concluded that governance, and the integrity of the nation-state, increasingly will rely on 
the process of ensuring the emergence and movement of such “guiding metaphor-models” 
through the information system, as well as their embodiment in organizational form.  
The merit of this vision of nation-state governance to 2015 is that it does not call for a radical 
transformation of institutions -- which is unlikely in the absence of any major catastrophe.  
Rather it calls for a change in the ways of thinking about what is circulated through society’s 
information systems as the triggering force for any action.  Nation-states will survive and evolve 
to the extent that they are able to cultivate more attractive, dynamic metaphors as information-
interpretation vehicles through which to navigate the complexities of turbulent societies. 
  
  
The Nonprofit Sector 
In describing the nonprofit sector, Lester Salamon10 asserted that the world is in the midst of a 
“global associational revolution,” a massive expansion of nonprofit activity and citizen action 
outside the boundaries of the market and the state, that may prove to be as significant a 
development as the rise of the nation-state.  This development reflects a number of rather 
profound social, political, and technological developments. This expansion has been caused by: 
 
• the limitations of states’ abilities to deal with the interrelated social welfare, developmental, 
and environmental challenges;  
• the spread of information technology, which has opened new opportunities for grassroots 
organizational development and cross-national organizational linkages; 
• the significant growth of educated middle classes, who turn to alternative forms of political 
organization to achieve upward mobility when they perceive that state-based forms of 
political organization are unresponsive; and 
• the globalization of philanthropy and the emergence of external actors committed to fostering 
the growth of civil society in developing regions. 
 
Nonprofit organizations appear to be growing much faster than the other components of the 
economies of the countries for which data are available.  
  
Despite its increasing importance, Salamon maintained that the nonprofit or civil society sector is 
poorly understood and under-appreciated in most parts of the world.  One reason for this is the 
tremendous diversity of this sector and the resulting confusion that exists about what it really 
contains.  A wide variety of terms used to depict the range of nonprofits focus attention on one 
facet of these organizations while downplaying or minimizing other important aspects.  Several 
different definitions in the literature have significant drawbacks.  Salamon has developed the 
“structural/operational definition” of the nonprofit sector, which places entities in the nonprofit 
sector if they are: 
 
• organizations, i.e., institutionalized to some extent, even if not formally registered; 
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• private, i.e., institutionally separate from government; 
• nonprofit distributing, i.e., not returning profits to their owners or directors; 
• self-governing, i.e., equipped to control their own activities; and 
• voluntary, i.e., involving some meaningful degree of voluntary participation. 
  
Salamon has developed a systematic picture of the scope and structure of the nonprofit sector in 
23 countries stretching over six continents.  He offered the following ways to categorize these 
organizations: 
  
• Number.  As of the mid-1990s, approximately 3 million organizations were in operation.  
The number of organizations, however, is not a very effective measure of the presence of 
nonprofit activity because data on the number of organizations is rarely reliable, 
organizations vary widely in size, and most data systems fail to purge inactive or defunct 
organizations.   
  
• Employment.  A more reliable indicator of organizational activity is the number of people 
that work in nonprofit sector organizations either as paid staff or volunteers.  Nonprofit 
organizations turn out to be major employers in many countries and have substantial 
expenditures as well.  The bulk of this employment is in the social welfare field, including 
health, education, and social services; development and advocacy account for relatively small 




• One out of every 20 nonagricultural workers; 
• One out of every ten service workers; 
• More employees than are employed in the utilities, textile manufacturing, printing, or 
chemical manufacturing industries in these countries, and nearly as many as in 
transport and communications;  
• Including volunteers, nonprofit employment swells to one out of every 14 workers, or 
7 percent of the total. 
  
• Expenditures.  Nonprofit activity accounts for nearly five percent of the combined gross 
domestic product of the countries studied. 
  
• Revenue structure.  The largest component of nonprofit income is fees and charges, which 
account for nearly 50 percent of total nonprofit income.  Government support is the second-
largest source of nonprofit support, accounting for just over 40 percent.  Private philanthropy 
from individuals, corporations and foundations comes in a distant third, with only 10 percent 
of total support. 
  
Salamon asserted that the spread and growth of nonprofit organizations throughout the world has 
important implications for the power and role of states and for the governance process.  For 
political parties, the proliferation of nonprofit organizations has disrupted their monopoly on the 
political process as upstart single-purpose groups emerge and attract popular support.  This trend 
also provides greater opportunities for popular political expression and contributes to the 
democratization of political systems.  While contributing to democratization, the expansion of 
nonprofit issue and interest representation can lead to political stalemate and gridlock; specific 
outcomes will depend on local political traditions, governance arrangements, and leadership 
skills.   
  
Along with multinational corporations that challenge the premier role of national governments in 
the international arena, multinational nonprofit networks have also become major actors on the 
global policy scene.  Despite their loose structure, the ability of these networks to mobilize 
constituencies from around the globe has caused the impact of these networks on both domestic 
and international policy to grow.  Multinational corporations have been increasingly vulnerable 
to forms of cross-national mobilization by nonprofits.  Through access to the press and networks 
of local activists, nonprofit organizations are increasingly in a position to hold the reputations of 
large multinational corporations hostage, inducing the corporations to take preemptive action to 
fend off the risk. 
  
Salamon asserted that, along with a number of other forces, the growth of nonprofit 
organizations is pushing government into a far different role: a role as orchestrator and 
collaborator rather than monopoly provider of public services. In other words, states will 
increasingly manage the activities of a range of non-state actors that provide services directly to 
citizens rather than attempt to provide all services itself.  Salamon contends that the impulse for 
this transformation has been both conceptual and practical, stemming from both a growing public 
frustration with the cost and effectiveness of exclusively governmental solutions to complex 
social, economic, and environmental problems and an ideological commitment to rely heavily on 
alternative arrangements to address public problems.  The result of this transformation has been a 
massive proliferation of new tools of public action including loans, grants, and vouchers.  Their 
indirect nature and their reliance on a host of third parties to carry out public functions 
characterize these new tools.  As major beneficiaries of this trend, nonprofit organizations have 
been instrumental in advocating programs that they then help to implement.  Nonprofits 
consequently function both as pressure groups pushing governments to act and as partners 
helping governments respond to the pressure. 
  
Salamon explained that the spread and growth of nonprofit organizations has facilitated the 
emergence of a new collaborative style of governance in which government is obliged to share 
significant portions of its discretionary authority over the spending of public funds with a host of 
third-party institutions, including a wide assortment of nonprofit organizations.  A paradigm shift 
is therefore under way in the operation of the public sector as we enter the era of “new 
governance.”  This new governance involves some major shifts in how we think about public 
management and how we approach public problems.  The nonprofit sector’s growing availability 
and its expanding ability to shoulder additional social functions have significantly helped to 
facilitate the trend toward indirect governance that is now under way.  In the process, the 
nonprofit sector has benefited tremendously, gaining new sources of revenue and new relevance 
to social problem solving.  Salamon contended that the “new governance” is the wave of the 
future and that states will increasingly have to adjust their structures and their management styles 
to this new reality of shared rule. 
  
Salamon concluded by noting that the civil sector has clearly arrived as a force to be reckoned 
with on the global level.  While it can at times be a disruptive force, as the recent events in 
Seattle demonstrated, it is also a potentially positive one, mobilizing citizens yearning for a 
better life and signaling a new popular willingness to take some initiative in working for the 
common good.  He asserted that a key issue for the next two decades will be how governments at 
all levels react to these developments.  Where governments resist them, difficulties are sure to 
follow.  But where they accommodate the new pressures and join forces with the new 
organizations, important synergies are possible that may strengthen efforts to deal with public 
action.  For this to be possible, however, new attitudes will need to develop as well as new forms 
of political and administrative skill.  Developing such attitudes and skills are therefore high 
priorities for the years immediately ahead. 
  
  
Transnational Criminal Organizations and Networks 
Louise Shelley described transnational criminal organizations and networks,11 warning that, 
since they are clandestine, knowledge concerning their operations is sketchy at best and would 
profit greatly from further research.  Despite the secrecy that surrounds them, transnational 
criminal organizations are known to be extensive, and they are growing.  Criminal networks are 
flexible and capable of rapidly changing structure to suit particular missions and activities.  
Transnational criminal groups incorporate components of licit business (to facilitate money 
laundering, for example) as well as elements of state governments (to assist in conducting illicit 
activities with a minimum of interference).  In some countries, such as Japan and Italy, organized 
crime has developed along with the state.  In others, such as Colombia, the rise of organized 
crime has contributed to the collapse of state institutions and the rise of regional conflicts.   
  
Violence and corruption are two potent weapons of organized crime in their struggle with the 
state.  Politicians and law enforcers who subsequently rethink their relationships and crack down 
on crime groups are subject to particularly violent retaliation. But often collusive relationships 
are based on the corruption of public officials without any hint of violence.  The costs of 
corruption can be as high or higher than those of organized crime.  Corruption reduces the level 
of foreign direct investment and makes domestic firms more reliant on bank loans. Corrupt 
countries also have more volatile stock markets, more insider training and smaller capital 
markets.  Research commissioned by Transparency International reveals that the highest levels 
of corruption are in many of the transitional societies of the former socialist world and also in 
those with strong export dependence on oil such as Azerbaijan, Indonesia, and Nigeria, which 
rank as the most corrupted countries. 
  
The Internet has also proved to be a valuable tool of organized crime, which exploits forms of 
Internet communication because electronic messages leave no trace and are hard or impossible to 
trace to their point of origin.  Information technology enables criminal groups to operate across 
borders in an environment essentially free from government controls. 
  
Shelley noted that organized crime might not be an unmitigated bad in some parts of the world.  
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The proceeds of organized crime may be repatriated and invested in the host country, providing 
capital for economic development.  On the other hand, criminal groups may repatriate little of 
their capital.  For instance, crime groups in Russia and other post-socialist countries usually 
export almost all of their profits, exacerbating capital flight problems. 
  
Shelley noted that transnational criminal groups can be categorized in a number of ways: 
  
• By country of origin.  Italy, Colombia, Mexico, China, Japan, Nigeria, and the former Soviet 
Union are the major source countries for organized crime groups.  In addition, crime groups 
in Brazil, South Africa, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Turkey may attain greater 
international significance in the near future. 
  
• By relationship to the legitimate economy.  Transnational organized crime groups lie along a 
continuum in terms of their integration with the legitimate economy.  There are many critical 
points of nexus between the legitimate and illegitimate worlds, ranging from involvement in 
small businesses of ethnic community members to the ability to obtain public contracts from 
the state and reap gains from monopolizing privatization offerings.  Criminals, once 
embedded in the legitimate community, rarely behave as legitimate business people. 
  
• By structure.  The structure of transnational criminal organizations ranges from the 
hierarchical structure of the Mafia to network structures employing outside specialists and 
farming out work as necessary.  However, all criminal organizations are highly authoritarian 
bodies. 
  
• By product.  Some criminal organizations deal in one commodity, such as illegal drugs.  
Others, particularly those from the former socialist countries, are diversified and engage in 
activities that include illegal arms trade, smuggling of contraband, counterfeiting, money 
laundering, computer crime, and trafficking in human beings, stolen art, automobiles, and 
endangered species.  It is difficult to assess the effects of diversified criminal activities, 
where funds are more readily mingled with the legitimate economy and the human suffering 
is less apparent to the community.  The diversified global illicit economy linked to high level 
corruption and the range of non-drug related crimes have the potential to threaten the social, 
political and financial order. 
  
• By membership.  Given its clandestine nature, it is very difficult to arrive at accurate 
membership estimates for transnational criminal organizations.  Even if accurate head counts 
could be determined, they would tell little about an organization’s strength, its political 
impact, and the breath of its operations. 
  
• By assets, revenues, and the cost of their crimes.  The amount of illicit capital in the world’s 
financial markets is estimated at between half a trillion to one trillion dollars, and this amount 
increases annually.  Gross earnings from trafficking in illegal drugs – the largest source of 
illegal capital -- is estimated at $300 billion annually, which equals eight percent of total 
international trade.  Depending on estimates, from $85–$300 billion of this amount is 
available for money laundering.  The next ranked crimes in terms of revenue are thought to 
be arms trafficking and trafficking in endangered species, each of which accounts for $10-
$12 billion of revenue annually.  Trafficking in endangered species comes under the category 
of environmental crime, which also includes the illegal disposal of trash and hazardous 
waste.  In fact, trafficking in CFCs is probably the second largest illicit import into the 
United States after drugs.  Trafficking in human beings accounts for $5-$7 billion of illicit 
revenue annually.  Theft of stolen art and antiquities is estimated to be a $4.5-$6 billion 
annual business; the profits from this trade have been used to fund drug trafficking in the 
U.K. and other illegal activities in Italy and Mexico.  Other multi-million dollar illicit 
activities are automobile theft, counterfeiting of currency and products, and theft of 
intellectual property.  Computer-related crimes include child pornography, various financial 
crimes and attacks on computer databases and systems.  It is very hard to measure the 
revenue from computer-related crimes but, given the explosion in the number of legal 
prosecutions for these crimes in the last few years, cybercrime is on the rise.  
  
• By terrorist links and political links.  Organized crime and terrorist groups have mutually 
sustaining relationships in particular regions and countries.  Cooperation with terrorist groups 
that destabilize the political structure, undermine law enforcement, and hamper the 
possibilities for international cooperation in fighting crime may have significant benefits for 
organized crime.  On the other hand, terrorists may use the methods or even the organizations 
of criminals and their networks to achieve their objectives.  Terrorists may also resort to 
crime to raise the funds needed for their terrorist operations.  Examples of terrorist-criminal 
links include IRA money laundering, Tamil drug trade,  KLA drug trafficking in the Balkans, 
the links between the Colombian drug traffickers and guerillas, mujaheddin in Afghanistan 
and the drug trade, and Angolan rebels and illicit trade in diamonds.  The links between 
organized criminals and terrorists are much less frequent than the links between organized 
criminals and politicians.  Criminals seek the protective apparatus of the state and the 
financial benefits which this association can bring.  Politicians seek these relationships 
because they can obtain tangible personal benefits, secure votes and exploit the coercive 
apparatus of the state to use against their enemies both at home and abroad. A powerful 
political-criminal nexus exists in many Soviet successor states, Nigeria, southern China, 
Japan, Colombia, Mexico and Turkey. 
  
Shelley asserted that transnational organized crime groups and their networks will be much more 
important determinants of international politics and state capacity in 2015 than they are today. 
Already the crime issue figures significantly in international diplomacy in many regions of the 
world, and the exchange of law enforcement personnel is assuming an importance that diplomats 
once assumed.  This trend will accelerate over the next decade because the financial resources of 
the crime groups are increasing along with their political power. The failure of legal systems to 
keep pace with globalization, intelligence services to understand and assess the centrality of the 
crime issue, and the development of a digital era without adequate thought to regulation all 
portend a very different world in 2015, a world in which the nation state will be a less important 
actor on the international scene. 
  
Shelley asserted that countries with the following conditions will be the least vulnerable to the 
rising economic and political power of organized crime: 
 
• The state exhibits a large legitimate economy where domestic or foreign organized crime is a 
small share of the economy. 
• Non-organized crime related corruption, such as that measured by Transparency 
International, is not so strong as to make the state vulnerable to organized crime penetration 
of civil society. 
• A developed civil society exists. 
• The rule of law is accorded prominence. 
• Citizens and institutions are cognizant of the threat of organized crime and ready to use state 
resources to address the problem. 
• The financial resources of criminals are not invested in the economy to such a degree to 
make them major economic actors. 
• Minority and ethnic group members are accorded social mobility. 
• The state has the capacity to safeguard its territory. 
  




In summary, the emergence of increasingly influential non-state actors is having significant 
effects on the nation-state.  Multinational corporations and nonprofit organizations are 
challenging the predominance of the state in providing services to their citizens.  A new era of 
governance may have dawned, in which the focus of state governance is shifting from traditional 
monopoly provider of services to one of manager of a range of non-state actors providing 
services directly to citizens. The increased pervasiveness of non-state actors has led to calls for 
greater transparency regarding their operation, funding, organizational structure, and 
membership, so that both governments and individuals can monitor the performance of non-state 
actors more effectively. 
  
Transnational criminal organizations and their networks pose a serious challenge to state 
capacity, legitimacy, and cohesion.  Criminal organizations have been able to co-opt major 
portions of the governments of several states, making them “captive states.”  Organized crime 
may also create “criminal” states, a condition in which the state’s government executes the 
policies of criminal organizations.  Nation-states are currently not well -equipped to counter 
transnational crime. 
  
When assessing the impact of non-state actors upon the nation-state, the relationship between 
state capacity, legitimacy, cohesion, authority, control, and the condition of civil society does not 
appear to be straightforward.  Significantly, it appears that a state’s government can delegate 
significant control over activities within its borders to non-state actors – in effect reducing state 
capacity – without serious consequences in terms of legitimacy as long as: 
 
• the standard of delegated services meets or exceeds popular expectations, 
• the state retains the authority to regulate effectively the actions of non-state actors to which it 
has delegated control, and 
• the citizenry attribute the new role of non-governmental organizations to a wise decision by 
the government to find creative ways to improve quality of life.  The government’s 
legitimacy may suffer if citizens perceive that its failure to provide services in the past was 
due to ineptitude, the result of corruption, or lack of concern for the masses. 
  
Depending on the nature of the delegated services, the reduction in state capacity may be 
accompanied by an improvement in the quality of civil society (e.g., the provision of health care 
by a nonprofit organization more effectively than the state has been able to provide it).   This 
improvement should increase national cohesion: 
 
• behind the ruling regime if it has maintained or improved its legitimacy, 




Emerging Standards of Governmental Performance 
  
Given the increased involvement of non-state actors and networks in carrying out essential 
elements of state performance, conference participants considered whether there are minimal 
standards that states must maintain to preserve their legitimacy and cohesion.  Discussion 
focused on identifying those state behaviors and societal conditions that were most likely to 
protect citizens from violence and poverty.  Specifically, the project turned to recent research on 
state failure, where aggregate statistical analyses have enjoyed success in identifying what can be 
considered minimum standards of state performance.  These studies have examined historical 
cases in which states succumbed to violence, which encompasses both intrastate war and various 
kinds of intrastate conflict, as well as instances where states have experienced financial crises, 
which include both monetary and banking crises. 
  
Ted Gurr briefed conference participants on the leading empirical research pertaining to 
violence.  This work included: 
 
• Gurr’s State Failure Project, which identifies significant factors predicting to internal war, 
abrupt regime transitions, and genocides and politicides;  
• Bruce Russett’s analyses of the “Kantian peace,” i.e., the conditions that determine the 
likelihood of interstate war between pairs or “dyads” of states;  
• Paul Collier’s work on the preconditions for internal wars from an economic perspective; 
and  
• James Fearon’s examination of the determinants of insurgency.   
  
Gurr stressed that all of these projects viewed the state as a “black box” that takes inputs and 
converts them to outputs.  Inputs typically include characteristics of the international system 
(e.g., trade interdependence and shared membership in NGOs), societal characteristics (e.g., an 
educated population, material resources, social capital, socioeconomic performance 
characteristics), and social and political institutions (cultural cohesion and democratic 
governance).  Outputs could include conflict management (e.g., avoid/win interstate and 
intrastate wars, maintain civil peace) and political stability (e.g., avoid abrupt regime change, 
avert humanitarian crises).  Gurr observed that empirical studies using this approach usually did 
not measure variables in the “state capacity” box, such as the legitimacy of a ruling regime, the 
quality of its leaders, the efficiency of government decision-making, bureaucratic competence, 
and the state’s ability to mobilize resources. 
  
Russett’s study12 covered the period 1885 to 1992.  His dependent variable consisted of whether 
or not a militarized international dispute occurred between pairs of countries (i.e., dyads) in a 
specific year.  Significant independent variables included the characteristics of the political 
regime (on Gurr’s scale from democratic to autocratic), the degree of trade interdependence, the 
number of international organizations in which a given pair of states shared membership, 
alliances, relative power, and distance between the states.  All of these factors had some 
influence on the likelihood of a dispute occurring, but democratic forms of government, trade 
interdependence, and shared membership in IGOs were the most significant variables postdicting 
to the initiation of interstate war. Thus, if a given dyad was solidly democratic and closely 
linked, both economically and through mutual membership in many international organizations, 
Russett’s analyses indicated that the risk of militarized conflict diminished on average by about 
75 percent.   
  
Gurr’s State Failure study13 found that three variables – trade interdependence, democratic 
regimes, and quality of life (and its correlate, GDP per capita) – postdicted to intrastate conflict.  
The study noted a strong interaction effect between democracy and quality of life: at low levels 
of quality of life, democracy is associated with high risk of failure, while, at high quality of life, 
democracy is associated with low risk of failure.  Gurr also showed that, whereas democracies 
are less prone to intrastate conflict initiation than autocracies, countries in the process of 
democratization appear to be more prone.  Gurr noted that the State Failure studies had 
experimented with direct indicators of state capacity, e.g., government revenues and corruption 
indices, but none of these had effects strong enough to enter the final models.   
  
Collier’s World Bank project14 considered three economic factors that were believed to 
contribute to civil conflict: greed, grievance, and start-up funding.  The project postulated that 
civil conflict or rebellion is largely about predation on natural resources (e.g. agricultural, 
mineral).  Collier found that greed factors are most important – ethnic and other rebels are 
motivated more by desire for and exploitation of material goods than by grievances.  Two other 
factors were found to be significant: support from diaspora populations outside the country and 
ethnic divisions within it.  Counter-intuitively, the most ethnically divided countries are not the 
most conflict-prone.  Rather, it is the presence of one or two fairly large but not clearly dominant 
ethnic groups that leads to conflict initiation.  By contrast, both completely homogeneous 
societies such as South Korea, and highly factionalized ones such as Indonesia, have a much 
lower probability of civil war initiation. 
  
Fearon’s insurgency project, as in Collier’s analysis, found that ethnic diversity in a state does 
not increase the likelihood of civil violence.  What did prove to be a powerful predictor of 
conflict was the economic growth rate, which remained highly relevant even after controlling for 
                                                 
12 John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations, 1885-1992,” World Politics 52,1 (October 1999): 1-37. 
13 For details, see Ted Robert Gurr et al, State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings, 31 July 1998. 
14 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 50 (1998), 563-
73. 
economic indicators such as per capita income.  Fearon stressed that the presence of democracy, 
high population growth rates, and population density were not important indicators for 
forecasting impending insurgency.  He observed that, since established democracies were quite 
wealthy, it was difficult to disaggregate the democratic government and economic indicators.  
  
Striking parallels exist among these studies.  International systemic factors are important: 
political and economic interdependence are consistent indicators, not of state weakness, but of 
conflict avoidance.  The one international factor that was demonstrated to be destabilizing is 
support from diasporas.  Domestic economic performance is a critical factor, economic growth 
rate being more important than level of economic well being. Distributional issues within a 
society are important, and quality of life is more important than GDP.  Democratic governance 
looks consistently important when combined with economic prosperity/growth.  Ethnic 
heterogeneity as such is not a strong risk factor.  What counts is whether the political and 
economic playing field is tilted against minorities, i.e., whether minorities experience 
discrimination in access to power and prosperity. 
  
Gurr stressed that these studies postdicted the initiation of violence in 70% - 80% of cases, with 
errors equally divided between false positives (cases where models incorrectly postdict to state 
failure) and false negatives (cases where models incorrectly indicate that failure will not occur, 
when failure does in fact occur).  The false positive/negative issue currently makes them 
unsuitable as an early warning system.  To overcome this problem, Gurr called for a balanced 
approach encompassing structured, quantitative analyses and the opinions and insights of 
experts.  He described two approaches that might prove fruitful in this regard.  First, Marc Levy 
is studying the utility of surveying expert opinion to obtain comparative measures of state 
capacity, i.e., questions about the consistency of the rule of law, the skills of civil servants, and 
national and local authority’s ability to deal with emergencies and other crises.  Second, Ernest 
Wilson has asserted that one can engage desk officers and other country specialists from the 
intelligence community in this process, based upon warning indicators from empirical models.  
Empirical research identifies cases where indicators have warned that the probability of violence 
is on the rise, and the country specialists use their detailed knowledge to assess how particular 
governments are likely to perform within these constraints. 
  
Carmen Reinhart briefed the conference on her research concerning financial crises, which 
certainly challenge state capacity and could be indicative of a state’s failure to uphold minimal 
standards.  Reinhart distinguished among three kinds of financial crises: currency or exchange 
rate crises, banking crises, and crises that include both currency and banking dimensions.  She 
found that four factors point to an impending financial crisis: asset price bubbles (real 
estate/equity booms), overvalued currencies, a slowdown of economic growth, and high levels of 
debt (especially short-term debt relative to holdings of hard currency). 
  
On crisis prevention, Reinhart expressed skepticism that institutions like the IMF could compel 
states to address pitfalls, since states tend not to heed warnings, believing that a crisis is not 
possible because “this time, things are different.”  She asserted that states can play a larger role 
in both crisis management and in minimizing the severity of a crisis.  However, significant 
differences in ability to manage crises exist between emerging market economies and more 
developed economies.  Reinhart echoed Ann Florini by observing that the presence of 
transparency improves crisis prevention and management.  Authorities should announce what 
they are doing and what they intend to do to combat the crisis.  Governments can reduce the 
severity of a crisis by displaying the willingness to make quick adjustments in fiscal, monetary, 
and regulatory policies. 
  
Reinhart also discussed the contagion mechanisms through which financial crises are transmitted 
to other states.  While trade interdependence is a factor, financial relationships are more 
important.  For example, with regard to the Asian crisis, the presence of common Japanese bank 
lenders facilitated the spread of the crisis to Thailand, Korea, and other countries. 
  
Turning away from the quantitative research sphere, Ted Gurr noted that observers seem to 
recognize good and bad governance on a macro level when they see it.  For example, when 
quantitative models have produced a false positive or a false negative, the presence of extremely 
good and extremely bad government respectively appeared to be a decisive factor in rendering 
forecasts incorrect. 
  
I. William Zartman described several characterizations for state collapse that fall outside the 
ability of quantitative analysis to predict.   For example, regimes can “quit.”  In this case, the 
frustration resulting from trying to cope with globalization, increasingly numerous non-state 
actors, and high popular expectations may tire individual regimes to the point that the leadership 
steps down.  A state may be “privatized” when non-state actors take over the functions that the 
government has proven unwilling or unable to perform.  A state may be described as 
“disappearing” when its government becomes so ineffective at providing for its people’s needs 
that the citizenry no longer expects it to have any real capacity.  The people look elsewhere for 
provision of vital security, health, and economic functions, perhaps finding that non-state actors 
(including criminal organizations) step in to fill the state’s shoes, and do so quite effectively.  
The regime may continue to exist as an entity, but it plays very little role in controlling activities 
in its territory, and its legitimacy is destroyed.  Alternatively, if state cohesion was initially weak, 
the regime may collapse as insurgency movements seek to take its place.  In the absence of a 
clear successor to the previous regime, the state becomes a “collapsed” state.  It may also be 
useful to create the label of “coping” state.  In a coping state, the government manages to 
maintain an adequate level of capacity, cohesion, and legitimacy to remain in power, but is not 






Conference participants reached agreement on five points: 
 
• States will remain the principal actors in the world of 2015. 
• Unilateral state action will become less effective as transsovereign problems become more 
prevalent. 
• Ongoing globalization and the increasing influence of non-state actors will pressure states to 
change the manner in which they exercise authority over affairs in their territories. 
• The increased numbers and influence of non-state actors that operate across state boundaries, 
and the need to grapple with transsovereign problems, will tend to create increasingly 
uniform standards of acceptable governmental performance. 
• Given the diversity of influences at work, there will not be any single predominant outcome 
in terms of nation-state adaptation to evolving international and domestic environments. 
  
States will remain the principal actors in international affairs in the world of 2015 because they 
are well structured to provide certain important services such as domestic security and the 
provision of justice.  In addition, the state has proven itself to be a very flexible and adaptable 
form of political organization.  However, project participants differed considerably regarding the 
degree of predominance states would retain.  This range of views primarily stemmed from 
differing beliefs regarding the impact of globalization and the changing role of non-state actors. 
  
The development of a more interdependent world as globalization progresses will create more 
and more transsovereign problems that are not responsive to unilateral state action, but rather 
demand cooperative solutions involving many different kinds of actors in addition to states.  In 
such cooperative ventures, the state must share power with other entities.  These problems 
include the increasing porosity of borders, the growth of transnational crime, a general lack of 
transparency among non-state actors, the anticipated rapid growth of worldwide energy demand 
and its impact on global warming, and the concentration of population growth among the world’s 
poorest people. 
  
The rise of non-state actors and the proliferation of transsovereign problems will pressure states 
to change the manner in which they exercise control over affairs in their territories.  
Governments will change from monopoly providers of services to managers of services that are 
provided both by the state and by a variety of non-state actors.  A principal reason for this 
development is because popular expectations concerning the services that the state should supply 
have expanded since World War II.  Many states are experiencing difficulty providing all of 
these services, and non-state actors, including criminal organizations, may step in to fill state 
capacity gaps.  In other cases, governments may be capable of performing a given function, but it 
proves more efficient to delegate the responsibility for providing this service to a non-state actor 
specializing in the functional area in question. 
  
Since non-state actors will wield an increasing degree of influence through 2015 and beyond, 
they increasingly will help to set global state performance standards.  Pressure will continue to 
build for developing states to democratize and to accept the economic and fiscal standards 
embedded in the Washington consensus, as well as the standards for civil society included in the 
charters of many nonprofit and intergovernmental organizations.  Given the increasing 
pervasiveness of information technology, the expectations of citizens in all states may 
increasingly reflect common, worldwide standards.  Individual state governments can seek to 
raise or lower the expectations of its people away from increasingly global standards, but doing 
so might require that state to isolate itself from mainstream developments.  Depending on its 
capacity, such a state could become a destabilizing influence on the international system as its 
standards increasingly deviate from the mainstream. 
  
Since each state possesses a unique combination of capacity, legitimacy, and cohesion, and will 
experience the effects of globalization and the rise of non-state actors differently, individual 
states will exhibit a wide range of responses to these trends.  Some states will actually improve 
their legitimacy and cohesion by skillfully adapting to changing circumstances.  A number of 
states will merely cope with the new developments: their governments will remain in power, but 
these states will not contribute meaningfully to solving pressing transsovereign problems, and 
their citizens’ quality of life will lag behind.  A number of states will not be able to cope with the 
challenges confronting them. Their governments may slowly lose legitimacy and collapse at 
some point, representing a risk to regional and international stability.  Project participants 
generally agreed that a better understanding of the factors important for improving the chances of 
successful nation-state adaptation was an important area for further research.
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